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1. List of all Parties 
All parties to the proceeding are identified in the caption. 
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4. Statement of Jurisdiction 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3(2)(j). 
5. Statement of Issues and Standard of Review 
First Issue: is Gillman entitled to a double recovery for the $3,565.47 in 
medical no-fault, personal injury protection ("PIP") benefits she had already 
received from her own automobile insurance company prior to the trial? 
Standard of Review for First Issue: a trial court's conclusion of law in a 
civil case is reviewed for correctness. United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater 
Park City Co., 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993). 
Second Issue: may a litigant recover costs under Rule 54 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure if one has not complied with Rule 54? 
Standard of Review for Second Issue: two standards of review apply to 
this issue. First, correctness, as in the First Issue. Second, even if the trial judge 
was incorrect that costs may not be awarded as a matter of law in the absence of 
timely compliance with Rule 54, did the judge abuse his discretion in declining to 
award costs? Lyon v. Burton, 5P3d 616, 637 (Utah 2000). 
Third Issue: should the sanctity of the jury deliberation room be violated 
based on mere speculation and in the absence of any facts remotely approaching 
5 
Bishop v. Gen Tec Inc., 48 P.3d 218 (Utah 2002)? 
Standard of Review for Third Issue: whether a trial court should grant a 
post-trial motion to amend a judgment is discretionary, and the standard of review 
is abuse of discretion. Gillmor v. Wright, 850P.2d 431, 434-36 (Utah 1993); 
Laub v. South Cent. Utah Tel. Ass % 657 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1982) 
6. Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, Ordinances, Rules and Regulations 
Rule 54(d)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is determinative on the 
issue of costs. It states: 
The party who claims his costs must within five 
days after the entry of judgment serve upon the 
adverse party against whom costs are claimed, a 
copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs 
and necessary disbursements in the action, and 
file with the court a like memorandum thereof 
duly verified . . . 
7. Statement of the Case 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below 
Gillman was involved in a motor vehicle intersection accident with 
defendant Isom. Gillman received minor injuries. Gillman had her own 
automobile insurance policy that provided the no-fault Personal Injury Protection 
("PIP") benefits required by the State of Utah. Gillman treated with medical care 
providers of her choice, and Gillman duly received $3565.47 in PIP benefits from 
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her own insurer. Gillman then sued Isom. The case was tried to a jury. The trial 
judge allowed Gillman to put into evidence all of her medical special damages 
evidence, including the $3565.47. After a three day trial, the jury returned its 
Special Verdict finding Gillman 10% at fault, and awarding her $5126.00 in 
medical special damages and $10,000.00 in general damages. Pursuant to Isom's 
motion, and also pursuant to the agreement of Gillman's trial lawyer, the judge 
then reduced the medical special damage award by the $3565.47 in PIP benefits 
Gillman had already received. The judge also reduced the Special Verdict by 
10% for Gillman's 10% comparitive fault as determined by the jury, resulting in 
the entry of a Judgment in the amount of $ 10,047.93. Gillman failed to file a 
timely verified memorandum of costs, fatal under Utah law to any award of costs, 
and the trial judge did not award costs. Gillman appealed. 
B. Statement of Facts 
Gillman was involved in a motor vehicle intersection accident with 
defendant Isom. R.,1-3. Gillman received minor injuries, had her own automobile 
insurance policy that provided the no-fault PIP benefits required by the State of 
Utah, treated with medical care providers of her choice, and duly received 
$3565.47 in PIP benefits from her own insurer. R. 140-148. Gillman then sued 
Isom. The case was tried to a jury. The trial judge allowed Gillman to put into 
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evidence all of her medical special damages evidence, including the $3565.47. 
After a tliree day trial, the jury returned its Special Verdict finding Gillman 10% 
at fault, and awarding her $5,126.00 in medical special damages and $10,000.00 
in general damages. R.,273-275. Pursuant to Isom's motion, and also pursuant to 
the agreement of Gillman's trial lawyer, the judge reduced the medical special 
damage award by the $3565.47 in PIP benefits Gillman had already received. 
R.,140-148, 277-279, and 430, pp. 11-12. The judge also reduced the Special 
Verdict by 10% for Gillman's 10% comparitive fault as determined by the jury, 
resulting in the entry of a Judgment in the amount of $10,047.93. R.,277-279. 
Gillman failed to file a timely verified memorandum of costs, fatal under Utah 
law to any award of costs, and the trial judge did not award costs. R., 287-288. 
8. Summary of Argument 
More than twenty years of Utah no-fault PIP cases clearly establish that 
Gillman is not entitled to a double recovery from Isom for the no-fault PIP 
benefits she has already received from her own automobile insurance policy. 
Failure to file a timely verified memorandum of costs is fatal under Utah 
law to any award of costs, and Gillman's memorandum was untimely. In any 
event, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in declining to award costs. 
Gillman fails to approach the Bishop v. Gen Tec rationale for invading the 
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sanctity of the jury deliberation room. Gilhnan, unlike Bishop, has not produced an 
iota of evidence that the Special Verdict reflects anything other than exactly what 
the jury meant to award Gillman 
9. Argument 
POINT I 
GILLMAN IS NOT ENTITLED TO A DOUBLE 
RECOVERY FOR THE $3565.47 IN NO-FAULT 
PIP BENEFITS SHE PREVIOUSLY RECEIVED. 
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980), held that a 
tortfeasor is not personally liable to the no-fault injured insured for special damages 
previously compensated by PIP benefits from the no-fault insurer, and that the 
injured party should, therefore, not be allowed to plead for those damages against 
the tortfeasor. 
In Bear River Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wall, 937 P2. 1282,1287-1291, (Utah App. 
1997), the Court discussed thoroughly the basic anti double recovery proposition of 
Allstate and the numerous cases that reaffirmed it including, for example, Dupuis v. 
Nielson, 624 P. 2d 685, 686 (Utah 1981), and Laub v. South Cent. Utah Tel. Ass n 
657 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1982). The holding of Allstate is "predicated upon the 
proposition that a basic principle of the No-Fault Act is to prevent double recovery 
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by the no-fault insured/' {Dupuis, supra, at 686), and "thus to avoid increased costs 
of insurance coverage" {Laub, supra, at 1309). 
Laub 657 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1982), not only vigorously reaffirmed the holding 
of Allstate, it also strenuously emphasized that an injured plaintiff "should therefore 
not be allowed even to plead for (special damages previously compensated by PIP 
benefits from the no-fault insurer)/' {Laub at 1307), and that pleading for previously 
compensated damages is improper and that a judgment should never include the 
previously compensated benefits. 
Now, on appeal, Gillman argues, for the first time, that the 1985 revision of 
the insurance code overrules Ivie and its progeny. Gillman argues that the pre 1985 
subparagraph (2) of old Section 31-41-9 does not appear in the 1985 reenacted 
Section 31A-22-309, and that, according to Gillman, this somehow reverses twenty 
years of appellate court decisions. Gillman's argument ignores the fact that the very 
subparagraph (2) of old Section 31-41-9 upon which Gillman's argument relies still 
appears in the reenacted insurance code at Section 41-12a-304. Moreover, it is 
troubling that Gillman's new argument now ignores specific language of Bear River 
v. Wall, a case Gillman cited to the trial jugde in Gillman's Memorandum in Support 
of Motion to Amend Judgment, R.,301. In fact, Bear River v. Wall, cited by 
Gillman below, but not here, addresses and rejects the very argument Gillman now 
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makes. 
First, at footnote 6 on page 1287, Bear River v. Wall points out that the old 
subparagraph (2) of old Section 31-41-9 now appears, substantially identical, in 
Section 41-12a-304. 
Second, at footnote 3 on page 1285, Bear River v. Wall, a 1997 case, 
specifically states that supreme court cases following the 1985 reenactment of the 
No-Fault Insurance Act "have not interpreted the current provisions of the statute at 
issue differently from the former provisions." 
Third, at page 1291, in 1997, 12 years after the 1985 reenactment of the 
insurance code, the Bear River v. Wall court still recognized the principle that the 
tortfeasor is not personally liable for PIP benefits, and that the purpose of the no-
fault statute is to prevent double recovery. 
Indeed, Bear River, at footnote 13 on page 1290, quotes Laub at 1307: 
the injured party should therefore not be allowed 
even to plead for [PIP benefits]. However, if a plaintiff 
does improperly plead for previously compensated 
damages and they are allowed to be included in the 
judgement, the court should . . . reduce the judgment 
by the amount of those previously compensated damages, 
and thereby prevent double recovery. 
Given Allstate and its progeny, the trial judge was quite correct in not 
allowing Gillman a double recovery for the $3,565.47 in PIP benefits that she had 
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undisputedly received. 
Gillman is in a bad equity position to complain. The trial judge gave Gillman 
a break by allowing her to put on evidence of the $3565.47, which undoubtedly 
drove up the pain and suffering, general damages award, before the judge reduced 
the verdict by the $3565.47 in special damages. Gillman's trial lawyer lodged no 
objection to the specific verdict reduction recitals in the proposed Judgement on 
Special Verdict before it was entered, nor is there any evidence from Gillman's 
trial lawyer that this was not the way the judge and counsel agreed to handle the 
matter. R., 430 at pages 11-12. (Gillman's lawyer on appeal, her husband, did not 
participate in the trial as a lawyer, but, rather, as a witness for his wife.) The trial 
judge was perfectly free to grant the set off at any point, and the Judgement on 
Special Verdict reflects precisely what the judge did, as does the Order Denying 
Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Judgment. 
POINT II 
GILLMAN IS NOT ENTITLED TO 
COSTS BECAUSE GILLMAN DID NOT 
COMPLY WITH RULE 54 (d)(2). IN ANY 
EVENT, THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HIS 
DISCRETION IN NOT AWARDING COSTS. 
Rule 54(d)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is the applicable rule. It 
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requires a party who claims costs to, within 5 days of Entry of Judgment (the trial 
judge signed the Judgment on April 26,2002 and the Judgment was entered on 
April 29, 2002) "file with the court [a memorandum of costs] duly verified . . . " 
(emphasis added). In this case, no verified memorandum was filed until well after 
the 5 day window provided by Rule 54(d)(2). Indeed,on May 13, 2002, Isom filed 
a Memorandum in Support of Motion to Have Costs Taxed By Court (R.,340-343) 
that stated: 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO ANY 
COSTS BECAUSE PLAINTIFF HAS NOT 
COMPLIED WITH RULE 54(d)(2). 
Although Gillman's's initial offering was captioned "Verified," it was not 
verified, nor was there an "affiant" as required by the rule. R., 287-288; Addendum 
Exhibit 2. Moreover, Gillman admitted to the trial court she had not complied with 
the rule when, on May 21, 2002, Gillman, in her Reply in Support of Motion to 
Amend Judgement, told the judge she had "amended the Verified Memorandum of 
Costs . . . to add a verification page. An oversight was made in the original. .. 
wliich has since been corrected." R., 377. It was only after May 13, long after the 5 
day window closed, that Gillman belatedly complied with the rule. Therefore, 
having failed to timely comply with the applicable rule, Gillman was not entitled to 
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any costs. Lyon v. Burton, 5 P. 3d 616 (Utah 2000), held that compliance with the 
rule is mandatory and leaves no discretion to the trial judge. 
Finally, in any event, it has long been the rule that even if there has been 
compliance with Rule 54(d)(2), the awarding of costs is discretionary with the trial 
judge. Lyon v. Burton at 637. Gillman has presented no evidence that the trial judge 
abused his discretion. At pages 21-22 of her Brief, Gillman argues Isom did not 
dispute any of her costs except the mediation. This simply ignores the record, not 
only what is mentioned above, but also the transcript of the hearing on the post trial 
motions, R., 430, wherein, at page 10, Isom made both the Rule 54 (d)(2) argument 
and opposed deposition costs. 
POINT m 
GILLMAN'S BISHOP V. GEN TEC ARGUMENT 
IS INCORRECT. THERE WAS NO DOUBLE 
REDUCTION FOR GILLMAN'S OWN FAULT. 
GILLMAN'S CLAIM THAT THE JURY REDUCED 
HER DAMAGES BY HER 10% COMPARATIVE 
NEGLIGENCE IS PURE SPECULATION. 
Gillman's claim here is, apparently, that based upon the jury's question, 
which was not objected to at the time, "Do we account for the effect of joint 
negligence or does the Court," that the jury somehow, on its own, contrary to the 
instructions that it had been given, reduced the plaintiffs award by 10% when it 
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answered the questions on the Special Verdict. This, however, is pure speculation. 
Before the jury started to deliberate, the judge instructed the jury with no objection 
from Gillman. When the jury sent out its question, the judge instructed the jury, 
again with no objection from Gillman, in response to the jury's question, "Please 
complete the Special Verdict Form exactly as written, in accordance with your 
answers as you proceed through the form." It is pure speculation that the jury 
reduced the damages by 10% when it answered the questions on the Special Verdict 
Form. It is more likely the jury followed the Court's instructions. The $10,000 
award evidences that the jury did not reduce by 10%. $11,111 is an odd number, but 
if the jury had reduced by 10%, $ 11,111.11 would have had to be the jury's number 
for the jury to, as Gillman now speculates, reduce by 10% on its own. This too, is 
pure speculation, but evidences the quagmire we venture into if we go by anything 
other than the Special Verdict. 
Gillman fails to approach the Bishop v. Gen Tec rationale for invading the 
sanctity of the jury deliberation room. Gillman, unlike Bishop, produced not an iota 
of evidence that the Special Verdict reflects anything other than exactly what the jury 
meant to award Gillman. 
Also, in our pending case, unlike Bishop, the mathematics defeat Gillman's 
wish for more money. In Bishop, the verdict form awarded Bishop $750,000 for 
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general damages and found Bishop 25% at fault. Bishop's lawyer, Mr. Young, then 
came forward with affidavits from three jurors, including the foreperson, that the jury 
found Bishop's general damages to be $1,000,000, and that the jury already reduced 
the general damages by 25% of fault, thus resulting in the $750,000 the jury wrote in 
on the verdict form. 
In our pending case, the jury awarded Gilhnan $10,000 in general damages, 
and found her to be 10% at fault. Gillman, unlike Bishop, has not come forward with 
a single affidavit. The mathematics supported Bishop's argument. Not so for 
Gillman. For Gilhnan's argument to work that the jury already reduced Gillman's 
award for her percentage of fault and that the judge did it a second time, the jury's 
raw number for general damages would have to have been $11,111.11,a very 
strange number for general damages indeed. 
10. Conclusion Stating Precise Relief Sought 
All of the arguments Gillman raises on appeal have no merit. The Judgment 
should be affirmed in all respects. 
DATED this G day of MRCti , 2003. 
By 
Robert H. Henderson 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellee 
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ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 1 
'V ^. 'M^.nalDfst . ict 
APR fi 4 200? 
wepui/ Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LINDA GILLMAN, SPECIAL VERDICT 
Plaintiff, CASE NO. 000907532 
vs. 
LOWELL H, ISOM, 
Defendant. Judge William B. Bohling 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
Please answer the following questions. If six of you are persuaded by the 
evidence in favor of the question presented, answer it "yes." If, on the question, six 
of you are not so persuaded, or if you are persuaded by the evidence against the 
question presented, answer it "no." 
1. Was the defendant negligent? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
(If you answered No. 1 above "no," then go no further and return to the 
courtroom.) 
-2-
2. If you answered No 1 above "yes," was such negligence a proximate 
cause of the accident? 
ANSWER: Yes / No 
J 
(If you answered No. 2 above "no," then go no further and return to the 
courtroom.) 
3. Was the plaintiff negligent? 
ANSWER: Yes K No 
4. If you answered No. 3 above "yes," was such negligence a proximate 
cause of the accident? 
ANSWER: Yes \( No 
5. If you answered "yes" to Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 above, then what 
percentage of the negligence should be allocated to defendant, and what percentage 
of negligence should be allocated to plaintiff? 
Plaintiff /P % 
Defendant 
(Total must equal 100%) 
-3-
6- What amount would fairly compensate plaintiff for the injuries 
proximately caused by the accident? 
Special Damages $. 
General Damages $^  
Dated this 4~ day of April, 2002. 
DC 
1/ —~ 
ci 
J 
tTRY FOREPERSON 
ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 2 
DuaneH. Gillman, #1194 
Leslie J. Randolph, #5009 
MCDOWELL & GILLMAN, P.C. 
Twelfth Floor 
50 West Broadway, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone (801) 359-3500 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LINDA GILLMAN, ; 
Plaintiff, ; 
V. 
LOWELL H. ISOM, ; 
Defendant. ] 
) VERIFIED MEMORANDUM OF COST 
) Case No. 00907532 
) The Honorable Judge W. Bohling 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
I, Leslie J. Randolph, being first duly sworn, depose and state as follows: 
1. I am an attorney duly admitted to the Bar of the State of Utah and am a member of 
the Law Office of McDowell & Gillman, P.C, attorneys for the plaintiff in this action. 
2. I am informed and believe that the following costs and disbursements are correct 
-1-
and have been necessarily incurred in this action: 
(a). Filing Fees (complaint) $120.00 
(b). Jury Demand Fee $50.00 
(c). Constable Service Complaint $35.00 
(d). Deposition Transcript $384.35. 
(e). Witness fee & Mileage (Dr. States) $24.11 
(f). Court Ordered Mediation $250.00 
TOTAL $ 863.43 
DATED this 3rd day of May 2002. 
teslie J. Randolph 
McDowell & Gillman, W.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 3rd day of May, 2002,1 did deliver by U.S. Mail, first class 
postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing motion to the following person(s): 
Robert H. Henderson 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
McDowell & Gillman, P.C 
-2-
ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 3 
ROBERT H. HENDERSON (A 1461) 
Attorney for Defendant 
191 North Canyon Road 
Post Office Box 112350 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone (801) 355-1574 
Facsimile (801) 355-1582 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LINDA GTLLMAN, Plaintiff, 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
vs MOTION TO AMEND JUDGEMENT 
LOWELL H. ISOM, Defendant. Judge William L. Bohling 
Civil No. 000907532 
Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Judgment came on regularly for a hearing on July 25, 2002. 
The parties were represented by their counsel of record. The court had reviewed the memoranda 
and fully heard the argument of counsel. The court is of the opinion that a plaintiff may not 
"double dip" for no-fault benefits previously received, that there is no evidence the jury applied 
the 10% reduction for plaintiffs fault to its damage award, and the court uses its discretion to 
deny any award of costs in this case. Based thereon, now, therefore, it is hereby ordered that the 
Motion to Amend Judgement be, and hereby is denied. 
Dated this i ? day of A>J » T ,2002. 
BY THE COURT 
District Court Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I served the attached Order Denying Motion To Amend 
Judgement 
(Case Number 907532, in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah) upon the parties listed below by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope 
addressed to: 
Duane H. Gillman 
McDowell & Gillman, P.C. 
Twelfth Floor 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and mailed first class, postage prepaid, on the ^D day of July, 2002. 
HAND DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I, Robert H. Henderson, hereby certify that on March 6, 2003 I personally 
hand delivered two true and correct copies of the forgoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
to counsel for appellant by personally delivering them to his office in an envelope 
addressed Duane H. Gillman, counsel for Linda Gilhnan, at 50 West Broadway, 
Suite 1200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101. 
Dc^/J/gLL^ 
ROBERT H. HENDERSON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
